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Extending the EU Commission’s proposal for a reform of
the EU Emissions Trading System
March 2016

1 Introduction
On 15th of July 2015, the European Commission released its proposal for a reform
of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The reasons for a rather thorough
reform are obvious: First, the mechanism of supply and demand is not working
properly as the market for emissions allowances currently exhibits a surplus of
more than one year’s emissions, thus causing the price for carbon to be very low
and as a consequence postponing investment decisions into carbon reducing technologies. Second, the EU ETS needs major adjustments regarding the long-term
perspective of a possible carbon path that is relevant for low-carbon investment
decisions under risk. Third, the EU ETS needs to be aligned with the 2030 framework for climate and energy policy, which in turn has to be updated in view of the
Paris Climate Conference that took place in December 2015. Although the Commission proposal addresses all these issues, there is emerging evidence that only additional reform steps will bring the EU ETS back to its intended role of becoming the
cornerstone of EU climate policy.
Pursuing an evidence based approach we summarize the key elements of the European Commission’s proposal and offer facts about the current state of the EU
ETS. Taking these findings as a basis we provide propositions for enhancing the
allocation procedure of both free and auctioned allowances, the key element in the
cap and trade design, to address the problem of oversupply. We link this procedure
closely to the relevant suggestions of the Commission proposal and offer extensions that can particularly make the allocation of free allowances more targeted
and effective. We indicate how free allowances can be calculated, both for sectors
and installations, and conclude that such reform steps could reduce the administrative burden of the system. Additionally, we supply key data for evaluating the
stringency and cost impacts of the EU ETS on sectors and installations.

2 The European Commission proposal for the revision of the EU
Emissions Trading System
We focus on topics in the Commission proposal that are in particular relevant for
making the EU ETS more effective with respect to benchmark procedures, carbon
leakage criteria, output-based free allocations, indirect emissions and the split between auctioned and free allowances.
2.1 The key elements of the Commission proposal
Duration of Phase 4
After Phase 3, which started in 2013 and ends in 2020, Phase 4 will span the ten
years from 2021 to 2030 and will be split in two five year periods for adjusting the
allocation of free allowances.
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Long-term target
The Linear Reduction Factor (LRF) increases from 1.74% in Phase 3 (corresponding to a decrease of 38 million tons CO2 per year) to 2.2% (48 million tons CO2 per
year) in Phase 4.
Auctioning share and volume of free allowances
The Commission proposal suggests that the same share of the overall cap for auctioning of 57% is kept in Phase 4 as in Phase 3. This number, however, needs clarification. Not the entire share of the remaining 43% will be available for free allocation since allowances for other purposes will be subtracted, e.g. for the Innovation
Fund.
Benchmarks and Cross-sectoral Correction Factor
A flat rate procedure will be applied to the benchmark values which were determined prior to Phase 3 and remained unchanged since. On average the uniform reduction of benchmark values will be 1% per year with deviations of 0.5% possible
in each direction depending on carbon efficiency improvements of sectors and thus
allowing for some sectoral differentiation.
In Phase 4 there will be two five year periods for the allocation of free allowances.
The standard updates to benchmarks will be a reduction of 15% for the first period
(2021 – 2025) and of 20% for the second period (2026 – 2030). This means on the
average a reduction of free allocations of 17.5% in Phase 4 which comes close to
the Cross-sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF) of 17.53% in 2020.
Thus this flat rate reduction of benchmark values interacts with the currently used
CSCF and will have the effect that the CSCF will have less significance for aligning
free allocations to the cap.
Provisions are made for more frequent updates of production levels which however will still have a significant time lag of the last 4 to 8 years on average.
Carbon leakage provisions
The currently used binary system, which decides whether a sector is considered at
risk for carbon leakage and therefore is included into the Carbon Leakage List
(CLL), is maintained.
Trade intensity and emissions intensity are combined to one indicator that is used
as a criterion to be included in the Carbon Leakage List.
Sectors on the CLL obtain up to 100% free emission allowances, depending on
their relative position to the respective benchmarks, whereas the remaining sectors are compensated with free allowances up to 30%.
The proposed criteria cut the number of sectors to be included in the CLL to about
50, i.e. about one third of the current sectors on the CLL, the corresponding volume
of emissions covered by the CLL amounts to 94% of total emissions i.e. only 3 percentage points less than in Phase 3.
Flexibility of free allocations
According to supporting documents Phase 4 will be split into two five year periods
for updates of activity levels. For the first period average production levels from
2013 to 2017 will be used. For the second period the average output will be based
on the years 2018 to 2022.
In addition there may be annual adjustments for production increases if thresholds
for such an adjustment are triggered. In the current system only downward ad-
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justments (partial cessations) are taken into account.
Reserves
The New Entrants Reserve (NER) is available to new installations or installations
which increase their capacity but also for production increases. The NER will contain 400 million allowances, 250 million from the Market Stability Reserve and the
rest from unallocated Phase 3 allowances. In addition unused allowances in Phase
4 will be moved to the NER instead of being auctioned as envisaged in Phase 3.
The Innovation Fund is a successor to the NER300 and allows for stimulating innovation projects for renewable energy, carbon capture and storage but also industrial innovation. The Innovation Fund will contain 450 million allowances, of which
400 come from the share of free allocation and 50 million from the Market Stability
Reserve.
2.2 Design of the mechanism for free allocations
Any procedure for free allocations needs (i) to address the amount of allowances
available for being distributed for free, (ii) to consider heterogeneity among sectors exposure to the risk of carbon leakage, and (iii) to quantify the extent of carbon leakage risk. In the sequel we summarize the corresponding provisions provided in the Commission proposal.
Cap of allowances for free allocations
Essential is the European Council Decision (2014) to keep the auctioning share at
57% of the overall cap, which is defined by the linear reduction path and decreases
annually with a linear reduction factor of 2.2%. Thus less than 43% of the overall
cap remains for free allocations since allowances for various funds will be subtracted, e.g. 2.5% for the Innovation Fund.
Binary treatment of sectors
The Commission proposal basically maintains the current binary treatment of sectors with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. Once a sector or subsector is included in the Carbon Leakage List (CLL) it will be treated without any further differentiation. An implication of this uniform treatment is the additional need for the
Cross Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF) to further fragment the total volume of
free allocation.
Looking for a more tiered mechanism of free allocation
The obvious deficiencies of this binary treatment raised discussions how free allocation could be better targeted towards sectoral differences. Two important references emerged so far: The Californian Approach and the Tiered Approach of the
impact assessment document (European Commission, 2015b) that accompanies
the Commission proposal.
Figure 2-1 visualizes the design of the Californian Approach for allocating free allowances. Three free allocation factors (100%, 75%, and 50%) result from four
emissions intensity tiers (measured by CO2e units per USD of revenue) and three
trade intensities.
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Figure 2-1

The Californian Approach for allocating free allowances

Source: A. Marcu and M. Elkerbout (2015)

The impact assessment document addresses tiered approaches that are not part of
the Commission proposal but nevertheless have entered the ongoing reform discussions. Carbon emission intensities (measured by CO2 units per EUR of Gross
Value Added, GVA) and trade intensities are the relevant indicators. Thus the carbon emission intensity replaces the currently used carbon cost criteria. This option
defines four carbon leakage groups (very high, high, medium and low) as illustrated in Figure 2-2. For each group, shares of free allocations are suggested (100%,
80%, 60%, and 30%).
Figure 2-2

The Tiered Approach with fixed indicators

Source: European Commission (2015). Impact Assessment, p. 148.

In order to avoid step effects, this approach multiplied the emissions and trade indicators. Based on proposed thresholds for the value of this multiplication four
carbon leakage groups (very high, high, medium and low) as illustrated by Figure
2-3 are defined. Again for each group shares of free allocations are suggested
(100%, 80%, 60%, and 30%).
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Figure 2-3

The Tiered Approach with multiplication of indicators

Source: European Commission (2015). Impact Assessment, p. 149.

3 Essential evidence of the current state of the EU ETS for
underpinning a structural reform
In order to obtain an evidence based guidance for evaluating the Commission proposal for a reform of the EU ETS we present what we think are the essential facts of
the current state of this system. These are the main findings:
 Until 2020 EU ETS emissions will decline faster than the target path and most
probably will remain below the cap until 2030. This would cause a nonbinding cap situation, where the huge cumulative surplus of allowances will
continue to increase over the next years.
 Provisions in the context of the Market Stability Reserve to counteract over
allocation will be not sufficient to bring this surplus down to the intervention
range of this reserve.
 High priority in a reform package for EU ETS therefore deserves an allocation
mechanism that limits the volume of free allowances to actual emissions.
3.1 The surprising strong decline of emissions
Most problems in the current state of the EU ETS reflect an unexpected strong declined of emissions.
Verified emissions remain below the target path
Figure 3-1indicates that verified emissions currently decline with about 2.5% p.a.
compared to the 1.74% reduction of the target path. Since 2005 this decline has
been accelerating. In 2013 and 2014 emissions fell 3.2% and 5.0%, respectively. In
2014 the volume of 1,813 mt emissions was 11% below the cap.
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Figure 3-1
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There are at least two reasons for this rather surprising decline. First, the ongoing
economic slowdown with a current trend for EU28 GDP growth at 0.7% compared
to more than 2% before 2008. Second, the strong reduction of emission intensities
with a current trend exhibiting a drop of 3.8% p.a. has been stable since the start of
EU ETS in 2005. These reductions reflect both an increase in energy efficiency and
a shift to a low-carbon energy mix.
Projected emissions might stay below the target path until 2030
Figure 3-1indicates emissions projections up to 2030 and compares them with the
target path, which declines by 1.74% up to 2020 and by 2.2% afterwards. The projections are based on the trend value of emission intensities, i.e. verified emissions
over GDP volume. GDP growth is assumed at 0%, 1% and 2% respectively.
There is strong evidence that only under a currently rather unlikely strong GDP
growth of 2% the target path may become binding by 2030. This perspective of a
non-binding overall cap has major implications for the stringency and in the sequel
the price signal obtained from the carbon market.
3.2 The high relevance of a flexible mechanism for free allocations
Many discussions about the Commission proposal focus on the split of the emissions target between auctioned and free allowances.
The split between auctioned and free allowances is less relevant than implementing a flexible free allocation mechanism
We continue our analysis under the assumption of 1% GDP growth and a share of
57% for auctioned allowances as depicted in Figure 2.
Given the gap between the target cap and the expected emissions, as visible from
Figure 3-2, the split between auctioned and free allowances is less relevant compared to a procedure that prevents free allocations to exceed actual emissions. Although we use an emissions path based on 1% GDP growth for this reasoning, the
conclusions are robust with respect to variations of this assumption.
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Figure 3-2
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Perspectives for non-industry sectors
Non-industry sectors, as heat and electricity generation, are assumed to obtain
their allowances via auctioning with temporary exemptions for some Member
States. Under a 1% GDP growth assumption Figure 3-3 indicates that projected
emissions are expected to match an auctioning volume of 57% of the target path.
Figure 3-3
ances
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Perspectives for industry sectors
The situation for industry sectors, which in 2014 account for 33% of verified emissions, is rather different as can be seen from Figure 3-4.
Industry sectors rely on free allowances in view of their potential exposure to the
risk of carbon leakage. Because of the rigidities of the allocation procedure for free
allowances these sectors obtained in the past volumes of free allowances that substantially exceeded verified emissions. Neglecting the reward factor in the current
allocation procedure, even a full al-location of free allowances would not exhaust
an envisaged target volume of 43% free allowances.
Considering that not the full share of 43% is available to installations and that on
the average not 100% of emissions should be covered by free allocations, two insights emerge: First, it is rather unlikely that the envisaged cap for free allocations
to industry sectors will not be able to cover even a high share of their emissions by
free allocations, and second, this requires that the mechanism for free allowances
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is modified to prevent the volume of free allowances exceeding actual emissions.
Figure 3-4

Industry sectors projected emissions and target auctioned allowances
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3.3 Switching to an emissions intensity based allocation of free allowances
prevents excessive allocations
Besides designing the allocation of free allowances with respect to current outputs,
also an emissions intensity based allocation helps preventing disturbing effects.
An emissions intensity based allocation of free allowances prevents a surplus
of free allowances
An obvious modification that limits the allocation of free allowances to actual
emissions is an intensity target (free allowances per unit of activity), which is multiplied by actual emissions. Without adding any additional administrative burden
such a procedure can be embedded into the verification process for each installation as will be explained later.
A substantial additional benefit of such an emission intensity based allocation of
free allowances arises also for installations because their carbon costs per unit of
output are no longer vulnerable with respect to output fluctuations.
The cumulative surplus of allowances will remain until 2030 above the upper
intervention bound of the Market Stability Reserve
As consequence of the analysis done so far we obtain strong evidence that the cumulative surplus of allowances will continue to rise over the next years and the
provisions in the context of the Market Stability Reserve will be not sufficient to
bring this surplus down to the intervention range of this reserve.
This is evident from Figure 3-5, which is based on the following assumptions: 900
mt of backloaded allowances are put into the MSR; 600 mt of unused allowances in
Phase 3 are put into the MSR; and New Entries Reserve and Innovation Fund are
considered.
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Figure 3-5

Cumulative surplus and Market Stability Reserve
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3.4 The Commission proposal in view of the current state of EU ETS
Comparing the Commission proposal for a reform of the EU ETS with evidence on
the current state of this system we have reasons for concluding that the proposed
reform steps will not sufficiently resolve the fundamental deficiencies:
 Only some lagged output responses for the allocation of free allowances are
suggested.
 An annual reduction of 1% of the historical benchmark values is suggested by
the Commission proposal whereas benchmarks based on actual technological
progress will be updated only with considerable lags.
 The Market Stability Reserve is not able to provide a predictable stringency of
the carbon market.
Additional motivation for a more ambitious reform of the EU ETS originates also
from the Paris Climate Conference in December 2015. For limiting the global temperature increase well below 2°C as stated in the Paris Agreement, the EU will
need to increase its greenhouse gas reductions target for 2030 from the current
commitment of 40% to at least 50% compared to 1990. This will require in the sequel also an increase of the linear reduction path from the currently envisaged
2.2% to 2.7% or even higher.

4 Enhancing the procedure for allocating free and auctioned
allowances
At the core of the cap-and-trade design of the EU ETS is the allocation of free and
auctioned allowances, as both mechanisms combined define the emission cap.
Within this section we develop a procedure, which links closely to the Commission
proposal but adds a number of extensions for the allocation of free allowances by
• making the benchmark mechanism more targeted,
• adding flexibility with respect to activity levels and
• reducing the administrative burdens.
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We demonstrate that these enhancements eliminate the needs for a Carbon Leakage List and a Cross-sectoral Correction Factor without violating the overall cap.
4.1 The basic design for the allocation of free allowances
Basically all procedures for allocating free allowances are calculated by multiplying
a volume of free allowances per activity, i.e. the emissions intensity for free allowances, with a specific activity level, i.e. output.
Using the following notation for
F
free allowances (in tons of CO2)
Q
activity level (in tons products)
f
emissions intensity for free allowances
the basic relationship for allocating free allowances is
(4-1)
free allocations = benchmark emissions intensity x benchmark activity
or
(4-1)
F=f∙Q.
All preceding discussions about a reform of the allocation procedures for free allowances focus on the three questions (i) how to determine the share of free allowances, (ii) how to measure the relevant volume of emissions, and (iii) how to
combine both for obtaining the allocation of free allowances.
4.2 Extending the Commission proposal for allocating free allowances
Rules for allocating free allowances are at the core of the ongoing discussions
about a reform of the EU ETS because of their potential relevance for dealing with
carbon leakage. We discuss procedures for allocating free allowances that follow
closely the Commission proposals but add flexibility and furthermore aim at a simplification of data collection and a reduction of administrative burden. Therefore
we put forward a procedure that
 fully maintains a predetermined distribution between free and auctioned allowances under the linear reduction path,
 allows for adjusting free allocations to output fluctuations,
 maintains the stringency of the overall target as defined by the linear reduction path and
 enables to anticipate the carbon cost impact on installations.
Since this procedure can be applied symmetrically to all sectors and subsectors,
there is no need for an explicit Carbon Leakage List (CLL). Furthermore this procedure does not require the currently used Cross Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF).
In addition this procedure avoids that installations obtain free allowances in excess of their verified emissions.
4.2.1 Data requirements
Data for determining the allocation of free allowances are needed both for a reference period and the ongoing allocations for each subsequent year.
Emissions and activity data for each installation
The key data needed for each installation i are in physical units, thus avoiding
monetary variables (e.g., gross value added), which are problematic due to the vol-
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atility with respect to fluctuations in output prices and output volumes:
Ei
emissions (in tons of CO2)
Qi
activity level (output) (in tons of products, e.g. clinker)
These data are already part of the auditing procedure and therefore are available.
Trade data for each sector or subsector
In addition we need to collect on a sector or subsector level trade data in physical
units.
X
exports (in tons of products)
M
imports (in tons of products)
These data should readily be available for any specified sector or subsector based
on information of the market structure with respect to demand and supply. The
trade data are only needed for the benchmark period.
4.2.2 The caps for allowances
We know for 2021, the start year of Period 4 (P4), the overall cap and its intended
distribution to free and auctioned allowances:
CAPtotal
overall emissions cap
free
CAP
cap for free allowances
CAPauction
cap for auctioned allowances
with the relationship
CAPtotal = CAPfree + CAPauction
The volumes for free and auctioned allowances result from the linear reduction
path, which is 1.74% p.a. in Phase 3 and 2.2% p.a. in Phase 4 and the intention that
43% of the total emissions cap will be allocated for free to industries exposed to
carbon leakage.
4.2.3 Determining the benchmark emissions intensities of free allowances
All procedures for allocating free allowances end up in determining the volume of
free allowances in emissions per activity (output) which we coin benchmark emissions intensities of free allowances. For obtaining the volume of free allowances
these benchmark emissions intensities are multiplied with recent or even the actual outputs. Subsequently we indicate procedures for determining these benchmark
emissions intensities that extend the proposal of the Commission.
Benchmark period
Free allocations over a certain range of years, e.g. a five years reference period, are
based on data over a benchmark period, e.g. averages up to three years before the
beginning of Phase 4 in 2021.
Ranking installations according to their emissions intensity
For each installation i in a specified sector or subsector we calculate
(4-2)
ei = (Ei / Qi)
emissions intensity of installation i
(kg CO2 per unit of activity)
It is assumed that activities of a sector or subsector can be described by the same
unit (e.g. tons of products). This enables ranking installations according to their
emissions intensities.

12

Applying a reward factor
Installations may benefit from a better emissions performance by a reward component in the allocation of free allowances.
A reward factor rewi for the i-th installation depends on the ranking of the emissions intensity of this installation. (e.g. 100% free allocations for the top performers):
(4-3)
rewi = rew(rank(ei)) maximum share of free allowances for installation i
based on emissions performance measured by
missions intensity
Target benchmark shares of free allowances
For determining the share of free allowances both the current procedures and the
reform options as proposed by the Commission consider emission intensities of
products and their exposure to trade both with respect to the exports and imports.
We propose an enhanced procedure, which enables a more targeted, operational,
and transparent method compared to the current practice. The calculation of the
volume of free allocations per unit of activity follows transparent rules with the
following basic components.
(1) The exposure to trade competition can be compensated by
(4-4a)
m = M / (Q+M)
import share of the sector
(4-4b)
x = X / (Q+M)
export share of the sector
with the following characteristics about the respective sector:
M
imports (in tons of products)
X
exports (in tons of products)
Q
production (in tons of products)
(2) For taking into account the emissions intensity, currently unavoidable nonenergetic emissions from processes Eprocess of installation i can be used:
(4-5)
pi = Eprocess / Ei
share of emissions from processes (e.g. clinker)
(3) The exposure to indirect emissions Eindirect of installation i via electricity can be
compensated similarly via free allowances:
(4-6)
zi = Eindirect / Ei
share of indirect emissions
By adding up these components we obtain the target share tshi of free allocations
for installation i in a specific sector:
(4-7)
tshi = (m + x) + pi + zi + (1 – m – x – pi – zi) ∙ rewi
The components for trade, processes, and indirect emissions may be fully compensated, or differentiated compensation factors applied. This target share is limited
to 100 percent. The trade components are specific for the sector; whereas the other components depend on the characteristics of the installation. In addition this
target share can be adjusted by a reward factor rewi.
Not all suggested components may finally be considered for this target share.
Calibrating the benchmark volume of free allocations
By applying to each installation the target share of free allowances tshi to (benchmark period) emissions intensities ei and (benchmark period) activity levels Qi and
summing up over all installations we obtain the uncalibrated benchmark volume of
free allowances:
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(4-8)
Funcalibrated = Σi (tshi ∙ ei ∙ Qi)
If this volume of free allowances exceeds CAPfree, the discrepancy of the cap for free
allowances at the beginning of a reference period, is distributed over all installations via a calibration factor cal:
(4-9)
cal = CAPfree / Funcalibrated
Effective benchmark emissions intensities of free allowances
Thus we end up with the effective benchmark emissions intensity fi for each installation i, the key parameter, by multiplying the target share of free allowances tshi
with (benchmark period) emissions intensities ei and the calibration factor cal:
(4-10)
fi = tshi ∙ ei ∙ cal
4.2.4 Allocating the volume of free allowances
Over a reference period (e.g. five years) the volume of free allowances for each installation Fi is determined by multiplying the benchmark emissions intensity fi
with a recent or actual activity level Qi:
(4-11)
Fi = fi ∙ Qi
If actual activity levels are used, free allocations thus fully react to changes in outputs. We then end up with an output-based allocation procedure.
4.3 Maintaining the stringency of the emissions caps by flexible supply
For a particular year the total volume of free allowances
(4-12)
Ftotal = Σi Fi
will deviate from the predetermined cap of free allowances CAPfree according to
output changes.
Basically two supply actions are available for maintaining the stringency of the cap
for free allowances and the overall cap of the EU ETS. Either we allow a fluctuation
of the auctioning volume or a fluctuation of the overall cap. In order to ensure that
the overall cap over a reference period is not violated, additional provisions, e.g.
limiting the compensations, may be necessary.
4.3.1 Unused free allowances are transferred to a reserve
If for a particular year the volume of free allowances, which are allocated according to the above specified rule, is smaller than the corresponding cap for free allowances, then the unused allowances are put into a reserve, e.g. the Market Stability Reserve, as indicated in Figure 4-1.
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Unused free allowances are put into a reserve
Emissions

Figure 4-1

Unused
allowances
to reserve

Overall
target path
Free
allowances

Auctioning
target path
Auctioned
allowances

Year

t

Source: Authors

4.3.2 Additional free allowances are transferred from a reserve
If for a particular year the volume of free allowances exceeds the corresponding
cap for free allowances, the excess amount beyond the cap is taken from a reserve
with two adjustment options for maintaining the stringency of the overall cap.
Option A: Adjusting the auctioning volume
The excess amount of free allowances is transferred from the reserve and in the
following year the volume of allowances available for auctioning is reduced by the
excess amount of free allowances of the preceding year. Thus the free allowances
fluctuate around the auctioning volume as depicted in Figure 4-2. This mechanism
is only valid as long as a reserve exists.
Adjusting the auctioning volume
Emissions

Figure 4-2

Additional
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from reserve

Overall
target path
Free
allowances

Auctioning
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auctioning
volume

t
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Source: Authors

Option B: Flexibility of the overall cap
If in a particular year the allocated free allowances exceed the cap for free allowances then the additional amount is taken from the reserve and the overall cap is
allowed to exceed the linear reduction path. This means that the volume for auctioning remains untouched and the free allowances fluctuate around the overall
cap as illustrated in Figure 4-3. Again, this mechanism is only valid as long as a reserve is available. This adjustment mechanism was already suggested by Ecofys
(2014). Also the Commission proposal has a similar provision by making unused
allowances available for later allocations instead of auctioning as in Phase 3.
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Adjusting the overall cap
Emissions

Figure 4-3
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Source: Authors

Avoiding violating the overall cap
Concerns may arise if this flexibility in the supply of allowances might violate the
overall cap. In case of a surplus of free allowances this is not an issue since excessive allowances are – in contrast to the current procedures – just not allocated but
moved to a reserve. Only the case of persistent deficits of free allowances needs
special attention because of their potential violation of the overall cap. Such a situation can be managed by limiting the use of the reserve.
4.4 Administrative aspects
4.4.1 Shifting tasks to the auditing procedure
Administrative aspects need to be considered both for determining the effective
benchmark intensity for free allowances ex ante of a reference period and subsequently for determining the effective volume of free allowances.
The benchmark intensity of free allowances needs to be calculated only once at the
beginning of a review period and is based on previous and therefore already available information from the auditing procedures, i.e. no additional information needs
to be collected. Thus for a reference period for each installation data on verified
emissions and the corresponding activity levels are used. In addition for evaluating
trade intensities, export and import volumes on a sector/subsector level are needed.
The benchmark intensity of free allowances is calculated by the administrative authority and is notified to each installation and valid for the duration of a trading,
review or reference period.
The effective volume of free allowances for each installation is administered via
the auditing procedure. Since now the auditor's task is to check both verified emissions Ei, and corresponding activities Qi, the effective volume of free allowances Fi
can be determined easily by
(4-13)
Fi = fi ∙ Qi
and the volume of allowances to be submitted as the difference to Ei, the verified
emissions.
A preliminary allocation could be given to installations based on previous years’
averages. Then the balance with entitled free allocations and verified emissions
determines the amount of allowances to be surrendered.

16

In summary the proposed procedure is highly operational with respect to its implementation and even eases the administrative burdens.
4.4.2 Incentives for installations
With this procedure, installations can foresee their carbon costs per output, which
are based on the predetermined volume of free allowances per unit of output. For
evaluating the impact on operating surplus, installations need to make assumptions about their cost pass-through ability and the carbon price.
Since the volume of free allowances is fixed, any improvement in the emissions intensity will result in a rent. Additionally this adds an incentive for technological
improvements to this procedure. Thus this procedure also has the quality of being
self-enforcing.

5 Cost impacts of free allocations
Different schemes of free allocations have different impacts on the carbon costs for
installations. We indicate by an example how these cost impacts can be calculated
both for sectors and for individual installations.
5.1 The relevant cost components
Sectors or installations are ultimately interested to what extent a particular
scheme for free allocations will affect their value added or even more specific, their
operating surplus. Figure 5-1 indicates that the final cost impact is the result of rather complex interactions which need taking into account at least
 actual emissions,
 carbon price,
 free allowances,
 indirect carbon costs and
 cost pass-through capabilities.
For long-run analyses also the costs and benefits for abating emissions and the impacts of overlapping policies, e.g. for energy efficiency and renewables, need to be
considered.
Figure 5-1

Cost impacts relevant for carbon leakage
Overlapping
policies

Emissions

Stringency
of total
allowances

Stringency
of free
allowances

Carbon
price

Direct
carbon
costs

Effective carbon costs

Value added

Source: Authors

Net-cost
from
abatement
activities

Indirect
carbon
costs
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5.2 An operational procedure for calculating cost impacts of free allowances
We demonstrate in the sequel an operational procedure for calculating the cost
impacts of different schemes for free allowances. We exemplify this procedure for
the sector non-metallic minerals with data from the EU input output tables.
Data requirements
For the sector to be analyzed we need information about the supply and demand
components, i.e. domestic production together with exports and imports and thus
implicitly also domestic consumption.. This information is compiled for sectors as
indicated in Table 5-1. If information about energy use is available, as depicted in
Table 5-2, additional details about the sources of emissions intensity can be made
visible.

Table 5-1

Sector information about production, trade and domestic consumption

Supply and Demand of Sectors
2011 Million Euros
Total domestic supply at basic prices

Non-metall.
Minerals
188.596

Use of imported products for intermediate consumption, cif
Use of imported products for final consumption, cif

10.426
1.794

Imports extra EU cif

12.220

Total supply at basic prices

200.816

Total intermediate use at basic prices

169.490

Final consumption expenditures
Changes in inventories
Gross fixed capital formation
Exports extra EU fob

12.588
950
1.305
16.483

Total final use at basic prices

31.326

Total use at basic prices
Source: EU Input Output Tables, authors

200.816
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Table 5-2

Sector information about energy use

Energy
2011 ktoe

Non-metall.
Minerals

Total energy

37.549

Solid fuels
Waste (non-ren.)
Oil (total)
Gas
Total renewables
Heat
Electricity

5.708
1.894
8.434
13.313
1.711
205
6.284

Emissions (kt)

172.612

Non-Energy Use in Industry sector
Source: EU Input Output Tables, authors

Simulation of schemes for free allowances
We provide for this database an analytical model which indicates how key parameters as the carbon price, the share of free allowances in emissions and the share of
cost pass-through affect value added and operating surplus.
Table 5-3 and
Table 5-4 summarize, e.g., how a change of the share of free allowances from 80%
to 70% affects the value of output, the value added and the operating surplus.
Table 5-3

Simulation of schemes for free allowances (1)
Non-metall.
Minerals

Schemes for free allocations
Carbon price
[€/ton CO2e]
Share of free allooc. in emiss. [%]
Share of cost path-through
[%]

20
80
10

Value of verified emissions [Mill. €]

3.452

Value of free allocactions
Cost pass-through

[Mill. €]
[Mill. €]

2.762
345

Effective emission costs

[Mill. €]

345

Change of value of Output
Change of Value Added
Change of Operating Surplus (net)
Source: Authors

0,2%
0,5%
2,8%
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Table 5-4

Simulation of schemes for free allowances (2)
Basic
Metals

Schemes for free allocations
Carbon price
[€/ton CO2e]
Share of free allooc. in emiss. [%]
Share of cost path-through
[%]

20
70
10

Value of verified emissions [Mill. €]

2.553

Value of free allocactions
Cost pass-through

[Mill. €]
[Mill. €]

1.787
255

Effective emission costs

[Mill. €]

511

Change of value of Output
Change of Value Added
Change of Operating Surplus (net)

0,1%
0,7%
9,4%

Source: Authors

6 Conclusions
Reflecting on the Commission proposal we suggest possible extensions for enhancing a reform of the EU ETS that are in particular relevant for industries that are exposed to the risk of carbon leakage.
Identifying exposed industry sectors
The Commission proposal maintains a binary procedure which determines if an
industry sector is included in the Carbon Leakage List (CLL). A combined indicator
based on trade intensity and emissions intensity is used for accepting a sector in
the Carbon Leakage List.
We suggest that instead of this binary decision all sectors are treated symmetrically but are differentiated according to their exposure to carbon leakage. This is done
by transparent and sector-specific rules for allocating free allowances. With this
symmetric treatment of all sectors a Carbon Leakage List would be redundant.
Benchmark procedure for free allowances
In the Commission proposal the current benchmark procedure, which allocates
free allowances to industry sectors basically by multiplying historic emissions intensities with historic activity levels, is maintained. Uniform reduction factors will
be applied for taking into account technical progress. Emissions intensities and activity levels will be gradually updated. Limited flexibility with respect to changes in
activity levels is considered. A Cross Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF) will be applied if necessary for meeting the overall emissions cap.
We suggest an allocation of free allowances that is based on more targeted benchmark emissions intensities for free allowances and on more recent or even actual
activity levels. A better targeted benchmark emissions intensity can explicitly take
into account on the one hand sectoral specifics as the exposure to international
trade and on the other hand specific installation aspects as carbon intensities (e.g.
currently non avoidable non-energetic emissions) and indirect emissions. These
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benchmark emissions intensities would be used over a defined reference period.
Activity levels could be updated more frequently or even substituted by current
outputs.
Such an extended benchmark procedure would involve the following steps:
 Targeted benchmark emissions intensities for free allowances are based on
transparent criteria for trade exposure, emissions intensities and indirect
emissions.
 Recent or current outputs are applied to the benchmark emissions intensities
for determining the amount of free allowances.
 Compensating supply measures maintain the overall emissions cap.
These extensions for the specification of benchmark intensities could be accompanied by simplifications in the administrative procedures. Since activity levels are
already part of the auditing process, the decisions about the actual allocation of
free allowances could be included in this procedure. Furthermore it is conceivable
that installations obtain a preliminary allocation (e.g. 80% of previous years’ average) at the beginning of the year.
With the suggested response of free allocations to output fluctuations the carbon
costs per unit of output can be better anticipated by installations. Depending on a
specified cap for free allowances there might be a need for calibrating once the
volume of free allowances at the beginning of a reference period. Both the targeted
benchmark emissions intensities for free allowances and the use of more recent or
current activity levels enable to eliminate a Cross Sectoral Correction Factor if adequate responses for maintaining the overall emissions cap are applied. Linking
benchmark emissions intensities to actual activities also ensures that free allocations cannot exceed verified emissions.
This extended benchmark procedure for free allowances implies a shift from absolute targets in terms of emissions volumes to intensity targets in terms of emissions intensities while maintaining the overall cap for free allowances. This shift
creates an incentive for installations to improve their emissions intensities and
thus triggers a self-enforcing incentive.
Maintaining the emissions cap
According to the Commission proposal the overall emissions cap for the EU ETS
will be tightened by increasing the Linear Reduction Factor (LRF) from 1.74% to
2.2% after 2020. In view of the Paris Agreement, however, more ambitious reductions will be needed for the EU to join the effort of limiting the global temperature
increase well below 2° C. The Commission proposal in addition suggests that 57%
of the overall cap will be auctioned in Phase 4. This number is based on the argument that this would be the same share as in Phase 3. More information would be
needed, however, for evaluating the auctioning share envisaged by the Commission in Phase 3 together with projected free allowances for industry sectors. This
information would allow judgments about the tightness of an implied cap on free
emissions allowances for industry.
Whatever a proposed partition of the overall emissions cap between volumes for
free allocations and auctioning might be, two response mechanisms are available
for maintaining the overall cap if free allocations respond to output changes. Option one allows flexibility of the auctioning share by determining the auctioning
volume as the residual resulting from subtracting the free allocations from the
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overall cap. Option two allows flexibility of the overall cap by maintaining a predetermined auctioning share and allowing free allocations to fluctuate by moving
surpluses to and deficits from a reserve. For maintaining the overall cap the adjustments would be limited in case of an empty reserve or in the case of persistent
overshooting of the cap.
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8 Appendix 1:
Summary of an enhanced algorithm for allocating free
allowances
8.1 Rule based allocation of free allowances
Free allowances for an installation are allocated by the following rule:
(8-1)
free allocations = benchmark emissions intensity x benchmark activity
Essential for the design of such a rule are the determination of the benchmark
emissions intensity and the benchmark activity.
8.2 Algorithm for the allocation of free allowances
Emissions intensity of installations
Each installation i reports data about
Ei
emissions (in tons of CO2)
Qi
activity level (output) (in tons of products, e.g. clinker)
for determining the emissions intensity
(8-2)
ei = (Ei / Qi)
emissions intensity of installation i
(kg CO2 per unit of activity)
Rewarding emissions performance
Installations may benefit from a better emissions performance by a reward factor
for the i-th installation, depending on the ranking of the emissions intensity of this
installation. (e.g. 100% free allocations for the top performers):
(8-3)
rewi = rew(rank(ei))
maximum share of free allowances
for installation i
based on emissions performance measured by
emissions intensity
Targeted benchmark shares of free allowances
The allocation of free allowances to installations can be made more targeted by
considering explicitly for each sector the exposure to trade and for each installation its emissions intensity and its indirect emissions. Four components can be
considered for determining more targeted benchmark shares of free allowances.
(1) The exposure to trade competition can be compensated by
(8-4a)
m = M / (Q+M)
import share of the sector
(8-4b)
x = X / (Q+M)
export share of the sector
with the following characteristics about supply and demand of the sector under
consideration:
M
imports (in tons of products)
X
exports (in tons of products)
Q
production (in tons of products)
(2) For taking into account the exposure to emissions intensity, currently unavoidable non-energetic emissions from processes Eprocess of installation i can be used:
(8-5)
pi = Eprocess / Ei
share of emissions from processes (e.g. clinker)
(3) The exposure to indirect emissions Eindirect of installation i via electricity can be
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compensated similarly via free allowances:
(8-6)
zi = Eindirect / Ei
share of indirect emissions
By adding up these components we obtain the target share tshi of free allocations
for installation i in a specific sector:
(8-7)
tshi = (m + x) + pi + zi + (1 – m – x – pi – zi) ∙ rewi
The components for trade, processes, and indirect emissions may be fully compensated, or differentiated compensation factors could be applied as well. This target
share is limited to 100 percent.
Not all suggested components may finally be considered for this target share.
Benchmark emissions intensities of free allowances
By applying to each installation the target share of free allowances tshi to (benchmark period) emissions intensities ei and (benchmark period) activity levels Qi and
summing up over all installations, we obtain the uncalibrated benchmark volume
of free allowances:
(8-8)
Funcalibrated = Σi (tshi ∙ ei ∙ Qi)
If this volume of free allowances exceeds CAPfree, the cap for free allowances at the
beginning of a reference period, the discrepancy is distributed over all installations
via a calibration factor cal:
(8-9)
cal = CAPfree / Funcalibrated
Thus we end up with the effective benchmark emissions intensity fi for each installation i as the key parameter for allocating free allowances to installations by multiplying the target share of free allowances tshi with (benchmark period) emissions
intensities ei and the calibration factor cal:
(8-10)
fi = tshi ∙ ei ∙ cal
Allocating the volume of free allowances
Over a reference period (e.g. five years) the volume of free allowances for each installation Fi is determined by multiplying the benchmark emissions intensity fi
with a recent or current activity level Qi:
(8-11)
Fi = fi ∙ Qi
Since activity levels are part of the annual procedure for determining verified
emissions, the allocation of free allowances can be part of the auditing procedure.
A preliminary allocation could be given installation based on previous years’ averages and the balance with entitled free allocations and verified emissions determines the amount of allowances to be surrendered.
8.3 Maintaining the stringency of the emissions caps by flexible supply
actions
For a particular year the total volume of free allowances
(8-12)
Ftotal = Σi Fi
will deviate from the predetermined cap of free allowances CAPfree.
The following supply actions are available for maintaining the stringency of the cap
for free allowances and the overall cap of the EU ETS.
(1) If for a particular year the volume of free allowances, which are allocated according to the above specified rule (8-11), is smaller than the corresponding cap
for free allowances, then the unused allowances are put into a reserve, e.g. the
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Market Stability Reserve.
(2) If for a particular year the volume of free allowances exceeds the corresponding cap for free allowances, the excess amount beyond the cap is taken from a reserve with two adjustment options for maintaining the stringency of the overall
cap.
(a) Adjusting the auctioning volume:
In the following year the volume of allowances available for auctioning is reduced
by the excess amount of free allowances of the preceding year.
(b) Flexibility of the overall cap:
In this particular year the overall cap is allowed to exceed the overall cap provided
that the reserve can cover the excess amount of free allowances.
These supply adjustments are available as long as additional amounts for free allowances beyond the corresponding cap are available in a reserve.
Limits in the adjustments need to be imposed also if the demand for excess
amounts of free allowances becomes persistent.
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9 Appendix 2:
Key data of EU ETS
Table 9-1

All countries – Overall position
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Table 9-2
All Countries

All countries – Industrial sectors
[kt CO2]

All refining of mineral oil
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
All production of coke
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
All metal ore roasting or sintering
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
All production of pig iron or steel
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production or processing of ferrous metals
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of primary aluminum
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of secondary aluminum
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production or processing of non-ferr. met.
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
All production of cement clinker
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of lime, calcination of magnesit
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
All manufacture of glass
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated

Ø2005-2007

Ø2008-2012

2013

2014

151.255
142.710
106%

144.473
134.249
108%

108.087
130.467
83%

105.450
127.494
83%

10.101
8.158
124%

7.617
7.464
102%

9.672
10.386
93%

9.475
10.450
91%

13.802
6.834
202%

3.165
2.743
115%

2.343
2.571
91%

2.241
2.791
80%

159.922
133.346
120%

193.535
113.541
170%

156.966
113.100
139%

153.385
114.143
134%

2.633
2.156
122%

5.082
3.340
152%

11.801
11.717
101%

11.320
11.737
96%

710
524
136%

642
422
152%

7.235
7.341
99%

6.967
7.133
98%

79
65
121%

71
43
165%

894
920
97%

852
1.006
85%

421
339
124%

714
490
146%

6.903
6.276
110%

6.741
6.548
103%

161.092
158.178
102%

179.508
131.842
136%

142.020
113.364
125%

128.994
118.562
109%

40.351
34.985
115%

44.205
32.958
134%

31.969
32.939
97%

31.249
33.090
94%

22.047
19.826
111%

23.759
19.309
123%

16.454
18.072
91%

15.924
18.093
88%
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Table 9-2
All Countries

All countries – Industrial sectors (continued)
[kt CO2]

All manufacture of ceramics
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
All manufacture of mineral wool
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production or processing of gypsum
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of pulp
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
All production of paper or cardboard
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of nitric acid
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of amonia
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of bulk chemicals
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of hydrogen and synthesis gas
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Production of soda ash and sodium bicar.
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated
Other activity opted-in under Art. 24
Freely allocated
Verified emissions
Share of freely allocated

Ø2005-2007

Ø2008-2012

2013

2014

18.055
14.861
121%

20.110
11.167
180%

15.465
13.563
114%

14.172
13.262
107%

830
730
114%

2.187
1.555
141%

1.595
1.701
94%

1.570
1.691
93%

83
84
99%

333
231
144%

918
1.043
88%

1.093
1.024
107%

9.443
6.267
151%

8.683
5.846
149%

6.948
5.797
120%

6.655
5.489
121%

33.906
27.984
121%

34.707
25.524
136%

28.458
23.297
122%

27.603
22.183
124%

1.188
1.029
116%

3.351
2.733
123%

4.216
4.067
104%

4.166
4.171
100%

2.646
1.965
135%

2.363
1.659
142%

17.875
20.335
88%

16.966
20.198
84%

22.446
18.285
123%

41.665
32.169
130%

49.614
42.543
117%

48.457
41.897
116%

951
781
122%

1.200
978
123%

9.452
9.282
102%

8.709
8.556
102%

758
672
113%

666
620
107%

5.297
2.868
185%

5.204
2.982
175%

300
7.121
4%

23.469
21.356
110%

15.081
21.096
71%

14.063
21.914
64%
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